And, in a new set of commercial and scientific arrangements, the United States and the USSR set up joint technical commissions to assess prospects for cooperation. Nixon's policy worked within this system, and, for the export of products exceeding the approved list, special exceptions were necessary. The sale of strategic goods to Communist countries was governed by the Coordinating Committee of NATO (COCOM), which administered an Alliance-agreed list of products and data embargoed for sale. In the early 1970s, the Nixon administration had no comprehensive policy for economic relations with the USSR. The coming of détente provided access for Line X and opened new avenues for exploitation. A formidable apparatus was set up for scientific espionage the scale of this structure testified to its importance. The bulk of collection was to be done by the KGB and the GRU, with extensive support from the East European intelligence services. Military Intelligence (GRU), the Soviet Academy of Sciences, and the State Committee for External Relations completed the list of participants. The State Committee on Science and Technology and the Military-Industrial Commission were to provide Directorate T and its operating arm, called Line X, with collection requirements. The Council of Ministers and the Central Committee established a new unit, Directorate T of the KGB's First Chief Directorate, to plumb the R&D programs of Western economies. To address the lag in technology, Soviet authorities in 1970 reconstituted and invigorated the USSR's intelligence collection for science and technology. The leadership recognized these shortcomings. In computers and microelectronics, the Soviets trailed Western standards by more than a decade. Cost accounting, even in the defense sector, was hopelessly inadequate. Soviet managers had difficulty in translating laboratory results to products, quality control was poor, and plants were badly organized. The Soviets viewed détente as 'peaceful coexistence' and as an avenue to improve their inefficient, if not beleaguered economy using improved political relations to obtain grain, foreign credits, and technology.(1) In pure science, the Soviets deserved their impressive reputation, and their space program demonstrated originality and accomplishment in rocket engineering-but they lacked production know-how necessary for long-term competition with the United States. Arms control, trade, and investment were the main substantive topics. They sought to engage the USSR in arrangements that would move the superpowers from confrontation to negotiation. President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger conceived of détente as the search for ways of easing chronic strains in US-Soviet relations. In the summer of 1981, President Mitterrand told President Reagan of the source, and, when the material was supplied, it led to a potent counterintelligence response by CIA and the NATO intelligence services.

Vetrov, 'Farewell,' who photographed and supplied 4,000 KGB documents on the program.

This effort was suspected by a few US Government officials but not documented until 1981, when French intelligence obtained the services of Col. al you might find this an interesting read:ĭuring the Cold War, and especially in the 1970s, Soviet intelligence carried out a substantial and successful clandestine effort to obtain technical and scientific knowledge from the West.

Ifart adds the farewell